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Abstract 
 
Demand-side financing schemes have increased in visibility over the past two decades as they 
are increasingly used in developing countries to address inequities in public service delivery. 
Conditional cash transfers (CCT) and vouchers are two such financing schemes that require 
certain behaviors of beneficiaries in exchange for financial incentives.  This review of the 
literature identifies 11 evaluations of financing schemes and their impact on utilization of 
maternity services. The results show a positive correlation between participation in a CCT or 
voucher scheme and use of prenatal care and skilled delivery. Consumer-led demand-side 
financing schemes have the potential to improve health inequalities and outcomes for 
marginalized populations in developing countries. 
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Introduction 
 Since the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000, there has 
been a renewed focus on key development indicators. As found in MDG 5, the United Nations 
member countries have committed to reducing maternal mortality by three quarters by 2015.1 
Key to the achievement of this goal is ensuring that women have access to and utilize basic 
maternity services that have been proven to save lives. Basic interventions such as having a 
skilled birth attendant who can recognize the signs of complication can have dramatic effects on 
preventing maternal deaths, and yet it is estimated that such skilled birth attendants are only 
present at half of all deliveries worldwide.2 
 Other sound interventions such as antenatal and postnatal care have been proven 
effective at reducing maternal risk and are also shown to be extremely cost-effective.3 Despite 
what is known about methods of reducing maternal morbidity and mortality, women still fail to 
access these life-saving services. The barriers to accessing services vary greatly by country 
context and they are multidimensional, but some are consistent across countries. A key barrier 
to preventive service utilization is both direct and indirect costs of the service. Poor women are 
especially vulnerable during pregnancy in the face of these barriers. With less access to 
disposable cash and often at farther distances from health facilities, their health care options 
are limited if not absent.  
 Research has shown that the poor benefit less from public spending on health than 
wealthier groups despite their arguably greater need.4 Because poor women fail to access the 
services that could save lives, innovative methods of increasing demand among poorer 
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populations for maternity services are crucial to meeting global health goals. Within the past 
two decades, financial incentive programs have been created to increase demand for health 
services among marginalized populations. Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) and voucher 
schemes are two of the more widely-implemented demand creation interventions in low- and 
middle-income countries. While there is significant literature available on childhood outcomes 
in health and education as a result of these types of programs, there is far less known about 
maternal health outcomes. Yet there does exist research on utilization of maternity services in 
varying contexts even if this is not the primary objective of the particular CCT or voucher 
intervention. Through a literature review this paper attempts to illuminate what is known about 
demand-side financing schemes to improve utilization of maternity services.  
The first portion of this paper will provide background on the types of demand-side 
financing schemes currently being used and a summary of the current research not related to 
maternity services. The second portion of this paper is a formal literature review of those 
evaluations of demand-side financing schemes that look specifically at utilization of maternity 
services as an outcome. Finally, the paper will address the challenges and considerations of 
implementation of these types programs in varying contexts. 
The Basics of Demand-Side Financing 
Supply vs. demand-side financing 
Many traditional programs to improve health outcomes have focused on the supply side 
of the health system. Historically, interventions have been centered on reducing supply barriers 
to healthcare in developing countries.4 Interventions to increase availability, quality, and 
efficiency of services play a vital role in improving health outcomes, but research has shown that 
supply-side interventions fail to reach the poorest and most vulnerable populations.5 World 
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Bank analysis has shown that health expenditures that reach the poorest 20 percent of the 
population is always less than 20 percent of total expenditures.6 
 Within the past two decades, there has been a policy shift towards addressing demand-
side factors that can be controlled through financial interventions as an alternative to more 
traditional social assistance programs that relied upon allocating resources through supply-side 
mechanisms such as general subsidies or grants.4,7 Demand-side determinants are the factors 
that influence demand for health services such as individual preferences, cultural practices, and 
community norms. Additional barriers such as user fees, distance to services, opportunity costs 
related to seeking services, and lack of education and information can also impact demand.4 
Demand-side financing, intended to influence the demand-side determinants of healthy 
behaviors and health-seeking behaviors, has been defined as “a means of transferring 
purchasing power directly to specified groups of service users for the purchase of defined goods 
and services.”5(pp 5)  
 So why do we care about changing demands? If we consider the Three Phases of Delay 
Model to seeking timely healthcare, the first two delays are demand barriers, the second being 
both a supply and demand barrier.4 These are 1) a delay in the decision to seek care, and 2) a 
delay in the arrival at a health facility.8 As such, addressing demand-side barriers to seeking 
healthcare is a crucial mechanism to ensuring access to timely and appropriate health services.  
 One of the key demand-side determinants for the poorest and most vulnerable is costs 
associated with seeking healthcare. If services are to be used, they need to be affordable to the 
target audience. Costs associated with seeking healthcare are complex and include more than 
the actual fees for the service. Costs can include direct fees, transportation to facilities, 
opportunity costs, informal payments to service providers, and even direct purchase of 
necessary commodities.4 For example, countries have seen great success in making vaccinations 
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free in order to reach a wide population base.9 Research has shown that user fees for health 
services tend to hurt those who most need the service.2 Although it has been suggested that 
people in the lowest wealth quintiles have lower opportunity costs due to high unemployment 
and fewer job demands,10 overall costs generally place the greatest burden on the financially 
needy.  
Financial and programmatic interventions to improve demand side barriers to health 
seeking behaviors include vouchers or coupons, conditional cash transfers, and health funds or 
insurance schemes.11 This paper will focus on those interventions that provide a financial 
incentive for the user to engage in the health system, namely CCTs and vouchers.  
Incentives 
 We intervene on the demand side for one of two reasons: 1) to correct market failures, 
or 2) for social equity.4 While improving efficiencies in health systems (the market) can be 
achieved through financial incentives, these types of programs are most often designed to 
mitigate social inequalities that result in poor health outcomes for certain vulnerable 
populations. The morality of using incentives for behavior change has been debated in the 
literature, some feeling it is government paternalism, others suggesting it can create 
unanticipated negative outcomes, and yet others saying these programs can stigmatize already 
vulnerable population groups.12 Nevertheless, incentives are still used as a means of achieving 
desirable behavior by governments in many contexts. 
Incentives “work on learning theory principles by providing an immediate reward for 
behaviors that usually provide health gains in the longer term.”12(pp 983) For demand-creation 
financial incentives to be effective, the value of the incentive must exceed the costs associated 
with the behavior. Ideally, services would already be free to those populations being 
incentivized to increase their uptake of the service. Incentives are almost always provided to the 
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woman of the household even in programs designed to benefit the entire household. Women 
are primary recipients of the incentives, because there is some evidence that unearned income 
received by women tends to improve children’s health more than unearned income received by 
men.13 Incentives can come in the form of cash or direct transfer of funds to a bank in countries 
with established banking systems. There are no explicit obligations as to what families can do 
with their funds once the obligations for receipt of funds are completed, but the hope is that 
financial incentives will be used to increase consumption of products or services to improve 
health and family wellbeing.  
In many contexts where financial incentives are used to increase demand for services, it is 
used in a combination of several public sector service financing schemes. Financial incentives for 
health, education and nutrition are mutually reinforcing interventions that are designed to 
magnify the effects of any single intervention.7, 14 While these public sectors may often be 
associated with traditional welfare programs, demand-side financing is distinct from welfare in 
some important ways. Directly providing cash to the poor can be empowering to the poor when 
they are given the freedom to determine how the funds are spent. It provides a direct link 
between service providers and the poor where they may not have existed before.7 Incentives 
have also been shown to be of a sound technical design as will be discussed in the results 
section of this paper.  
Conditional Cash Transfers 
History of Programs 
Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) are “transfers made subject to certain actions or activities 
by the beneficiaries,”15(pg 572) and as such, they are the first type of incentive scheme to be 
explored in depth in this review. CCTs developed out of a policy emphasis on market-oriented 
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demand-side interventions in Latin America.7,14 Out of a growing frustration with the lack of 
results from supply-side interventions, the government of Mexico created a program to affect 
demand for public services. Mexico’s Progresa was the first of the CCT programs with the 
intention of breaking the intergenerational cycle of poverty among Mexico’s poorest. This was a 
true social transfer program where “non-contributory, regular and predictable grants, in cash or 
kind *…} are provided to vulnerable households or individuals in order to ensure a minimum 
level of well-being”5(pg4) with the addition of requiring a set of prescribed behaviors. Families 
who met certain qualifications of poverty and met educational, nutritional and health 
conditionalities received regular cash transfers each month. The program was designed to 
capitalize on the mutual reinforcement of these related social services. Early evaluations of 
Progresa showed positive outcomes on infant and child health, school enrolment, and child 
nutritional status.16-19 With these positive outcomes, other countries in Latin America began to 
implement their own versions of CCTs with a focus on improving human resources.14 
With the proven success of CCT programs in Latin America, a series of similar programs have 
been adopted in other regions of the world. There has been particular enthusiasm in South Asia, 
but context is important to demand-creation programs resulting in some significant differences 
in program methodology.20 Perhaps for this reason, CCT programs have not been very popular in 
Africa where there is typically less administrative capacity. Nevertheless, CCT programs are 
being piloted in some African contexts, and computer simulations have shown there is the 
potential to reduce food insecurity through CCT programs.15  
How it works 
 Once a family or individual has been identified as meeting the eligibility requirements to 
participate in a CCT program, they are enrolled to receive funds conditioned upon fulfilling 
certain requirements. In Mexico, Columbia and Honduras, funds are only dispersed with 
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compliance with the following conditionalities: 1) proof of regular school attendance of eligible 
children, 2) collection of nutritional supplements, 3) completion of routine child preventive 
health visits as well as pregnancy care when applicable, and 4) parental attendance at health 
and nutrition education classes.  Cash is transferred on a regular schedule rather than directly at 
the completion of each conditioned behavior. For those programs more focused on pregnancy-
related outcomes, conditions for receipt of funds are use of maternity services to include 
delivery within a health facility with an accredited provider. (See Table 1) 
 Programs differ in the disbursement of funds. The Latin American programs provide 
cash transfers in the form of a monthly or bi-monthly stipend given directly to the woman of the 
household. Honduras’ program even provides monetary vouchers that can be used like cash 
throughout much of the country.21 On the other hand, those programs that focused on location 
of delivery during pregnancy only provided the cash transfer at the completion of the 
pregnancy. This requires women to pay upfront costs that will be reimbursed with the cash 
transfer post-delivery. In Nepal and India, CCT programs also contained an element of provider 
quality improvement by incentivizing providers to offer and improve these services. Providers 
contracted to participate in CCT programs were given cash transfers based upon the number of 
participants to whom they provide service.  While each program differs to some extent to suit 
the contextual needs, the incentive remains and can be compared across contexts with caution. 
 Public health experts recognize that CCTs are not without their problems during 
implementation on the ground in developing countries. As countries begin to pilot projects and 
evaluate young CCT programs, difficulties and unknown elements are being discovered. First, 
programs are only successful if the intended beneficiaries participate. Some of the younger 
programs in South Asia have confronted the challenge of advertising their program and ensuring 
that participants understand the benefits of the program.20 Once participants are enrolled, 
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incentives may not be enough to change behaviors. Time and transport are not directly 
addressed in CCT programs, but they may be one of the primary barriers to access of services.22 
If participants are required to pay costs associated with seeking services before they receive a 
cash transfer, this may not actually lead to increased access to services due to the temporality of 
incentives.23,24  
 Administrative challenges are very real in developing country contexts. If the capacity to 
implement CCT programs exists, there is the need to transfer ownership of the policy to lower 
levels of government.20 Eligibility requirements need to be carefully communicated to the 
lowest level for the program to run effectively.20 Administration of the program can only be 
effective if the supply side is of a quality to attract beneficiaries and is sufficient to meet 
demands.7 All of these challenges exist in an environment where significant questions remain as 
to the appropriate size of transfers, threshold effects, cost effectiveness of programs, and 
unintentional outcomes.  
Overall Impact 
Apart from the outcome of interest for this review, evaluations have shown CCT programs 
to have a positive impact on a number of far-reaching outcomes. Mexico’s Progresa program 
was found to decrease childhood morbidity, anemia and increase height in children.18 It also led 
to decreases in the incidence of low birthweight, the mechanism potentially being improved 
maternal nutrition, improved prenatal care utilization, or improved quality of care.25 One 
interesting finding was a dose-response reduction in socio-emotional problems among children 
of beneficiary families in the later stages of Mexico’s CCT program.26  
Programs in Columbia and Honduras were associated with increased uptake of child 
preventive healthcare.21,27 Columbia’s program was also shown to increase household 
consumption as well as increase newborn birthweight.27 Programs in Columbia, Honduras and 
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Mexico positively impacted school attendance for eligible children.14,21,27,28 Similar to Mexico’s 
CCT program, programs in India have been shown to reduce perinatal and neonatal deaths by a 
statistically significant margin.29 While many of the CCT programs, particularly in South Asia, are 
designed to reduce maternal mortality and morbidity, there is little evidence to support this 
claim due to the difficulty of sampling a large enough population to detect a change in this rare 
outcome.29 
CCT programs are not immune to negative unanticipated consequences. Progresa and later 
Oportunidades, being the most evaluated of the programs, were not always associated with 
positive outcomes. For instance, intervention areas saw significant increases in cesarean section 
rates, although the cause of this association needs further analysis.30 Additionally, 
Oportunidades saw higher BMI, overweight, obesity and hypertension among its adult 
participants despite the conditionalities themselves being associated with better adult health.31 
Conditional vs. unconditional 
 This paper focuses specifically on conditional cash transfers, but unconditional cash 
transfers have been used widely in some settings with similarly positive results. Unconditional 
cash transfers include social pensions, family and child support grants, and other direct cash 
grants to specific populations. These types of programs have not been included in the current 
literature review, because their target beneficiaries in developing countries are the elderly and 
children rather than pregnant women.5 Where used in Zambia and South Africa for pensioners 
and vulnerable children, unconditional cash transfer programs have improved health 
outcomes.32 
 The debate remains as to whether improved outcomes seen in CCT programs can be 
attributed to the conditionalities or if similar results would be seen with unconditional cash 
transfer programs in the same contexts. There is very limited evidence on the role of 
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conditionality on outcomes, so this leads to speculation among health financing experts.12,32 One 
of the assumptions of conditional cash transfers is that households would not invest resources 
into social services such as healthcare that are required of the CCT program should they not 
have those conditions imposed upon them. Research has shown that households would 
consume less of the conditioned-on goods without the conditionality in place,33 but other 
research has shown that households tend to spend unconditional cash transfer funds on items 
and services that will benefit the family such as food, clothing, and school fees.34 Other studies 
have shown that unconditional transfers will improve the welfare of poor families regardless of 
how the money is spent.13 Some suggest that both types of cash transfer programs work in 
developing countries through increasing use of services or food consumption to improve health 
no matter the conditionality.5  
 It remains to be seen whether it is the conditions themselves or the regularity of 
payments in cash transfer programs that make the difference.5 Many proponents still believe 
that conditional cash transfers can encourage societal preferences where unconditional cash 
transfers cannot.33 Also, conditionality encourages self-selection, so resources are targeted to 
those who are committed to improving the welfare of themselves or their families. It similarly 
engenders a sense of co-responsibility beyond a traditional cash handout.14 This debate is more 
applicable to financing schemes targeted to more diverse populations, so schemes targeted 
towards pregnant women remain conditioned. 
Vouchers 
A Near-Cash Transfer  
Where conditional cash transfers are direct transfers of money to beneficiaries, 
vouchers are considered to be “near-cash transfers.”5 Vouchers work under the same premise 
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as cash transfers in that they require certain behaviors or conditionalities, but the incentive is 
always rewarded after the behavior and in most often in exchange for goods or services.35 
Unlike CCTs where recipients must cover costs for services independent of receiving the cash 
transfer, vouchers cover costs of services at the point of receipt of services. 
 Vouchers are particularly well-suited to address maternal outcomes. Vouchers can easily 
target specific marginalized groups, and pregnant women are an easily identifiable group in 
need of specifically defined services.2 Pregnant women receive paper vouchers that entitle them 
to free maternity services where fees are a barrier to utilization. Most programs also provide 
additional monetary incentive above and beyond the value of the maternity service fees to 
provide additional incentive and to overcome costs associated with seeking care. These could 
include vouchers for transportation. There are voucher schemes that charge beneficiaries a 
nominal sum for the purchase of the voucher, but this paper looks specifically at cost-free 
vouchers.36 Vouchers are particularly beneficial for poorer populations, because they reduce the 
need to pay for services in advance, although beneficiaries may still be required to pay for 
transport costs and associated opportunity costs.2  
 Systems for implementing voucher schemes vary by country and scope of the program, 
but the vast majority utilizes a contracting mechanism. Providers, most often private, enter a 
contract with the managing agency or organization. Inclusion in the program is dependent upon 
certain criteria of service and facility quality. Funds are transferred directly to the service 
provider to distribute to voucher holders. Programs in Bangladesh and Cambodia also provide 
monetary incentives to the service providers who participate in the voucher scheme to be used 
at the provider’s discretion.11,37-39 This is intended to improve service quality while 
simultaneously increasing demand. 
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The contracting of service providers to participate in voucher schemes based upon their 
quality is most often described as competitive vouchers. Particularly in countries where there 
are inherent problems with public healthcare, turning to private providers may be a valuable 
option.11,35 It is a type of performance-based funding that can increase patient satisfaction as 
well as technical quality.35 Selection criteria themselves can heighten service quality, but quality 
checks and/or trainings need to be completed routinely to maintain quality standards.36 In 
addition, contracting of service providers can promote competition, and reduce provider-
induced demand while stimulating demand for under-consumed services.35,36 While these 
results are highly desired, the costs of implementing competitive voucher schemes can be high 
in both administrative resources and costs per transaction.35 
Overall Impact 
 Vouchers have been praised within the literature for their transparency, ability to affect 
quality standards, and their potential role in creating competition among service providers,40 
but many voucher schemes are relatively new and only beginning to be expanded to larger 
population groups. There is limited evidence as to their efficacy, but evaluations are starting to 
be rolled out as will be discussed further in their relation to uptake of maternity services. Initial 
findings have shown the difficulties with administration of programs particularly in Bangladesh 
where workers are over-extended as voucher schemes are added to their workload.11,24 The 
need for far-reaching advertising of the availability of the vouchers has led to a slow start in 
Cambodia.41 Programs have seen failures when the community was not engaged in the 
distribution of vouchers.36  
 As always, there is a need to improve the supply side to ensure that women actually use 
the vouchers they receive, a concern in Cambodia where voucher use dropped off during 
women’s pregnancies due to the perceived poor quality of services.24,40 It has also been feared 
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that vouchers may actually provide an incentive for women to have more children in order to 
receive the cash associated with the vouchers, although this needs to be studied further.11 There 
is always the opportunity for corruption in voucher schemes which can increase the need for 
thorough monitoring systems. Despite these fears, initial evaluations have shown that voucher 
schemes have a positive impact on utilization of health services, quality of services, and health 
outcomes for women.40 Finally, the majority of women in Bangladesh reported using voucher 
funds for food or medication as intended by the voucher scheme.24  
 
Table 1. Demand-side Financing Scheme Objectives, Elements and Conditions by Country 
  Country Program 
Program 
Components 
Objectives Conditions 
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
a
l 
C
a
s
h
 T
ra
n
s
fe
rs
 
Mexico 
Progresa/ 
Oportunidades 
Monthly health and 
nutrition stipend 
plus educational 
stipend for school-
aged children. 
To break the inter-
generational 
transmission of 
poverty by providing 
incentives for parents 
to invest in the 
human capital of 
children. 
Required to use the 
formal health system 
for primary care, 
attend prenatal care 
if pregnant, accept 
nutrition 
supplements, bring 
children to routine 
health visits, and 
attend health 
education classes 
Honduras 
Family 
Assistance 
Program 
(PRAF II) 
Educational, 
nutrition and health 
vouchers (used like 
cash)  
To break the inter-
generational 
transmission of 
poverty by providing 
incentives for parents 
to invest in the 
human capital of 
children. Health 
objective was to 
increase the demand 
for preventive health 
care among pregnant 
women and children. 
Eligible children 
required to maintain 
regular school 
attendance, attend 
routine health visits 
and parents should 
attend health 
education classes 
Nepal 
Safe Delivery 
Incentive 
Program 
(SDIP) 
Cash to women 
giving birth in a 
health facility and 
cash incentives to  
health providers for 
each delivery 
attended (whether 
in a facility or at 
home) 
To increase 
utilization of 
professional care at 
childbirth to reduce 
maternal morbidity 
and mortality. 
Delivery in a public 
health facility 
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India 
Janani 
Suraksha 
Yojana (JSY) 
Cash to women 
giving birth in a 
health facility 
To reduce the 
numbers of maternal 
and neonatal deaths 
by increasing the 
proportion of births in 
a health facility 
Delivery in a 
government or 
accredited private 
facility 
V
o
u
c
h
e
rs
 
Chiranjeevi 
Scheme 
Voucher for free 
maternity services 
from any contracted 
provider 
Improve utilization of 
facility deliveries,  
increase availability 
of emergency 
obstetric care, and 
reduce maternal 
mortality 
Utilization of facility-
based maternity 
services with 
contracted providers 
Bangladesh 
Maternal 
Health Voucher 
Scheme 
(MHVS) 
Voucher for free 
maternity services 
(3 ANC check-ups, 
safe delivery, 1 
postnatal check-
up). Women 
receive payment in 
cash at the 
completion of the 
visit. Also receive 
small in-kind gifts. 
To decrease 
maternal morbidity 
and mortality to 
achieve the target for 
MDG 5 
Utilization of 
maternity services in 
contracted private 
facilities of any 
public facility 
Demand-side 
Financing Pilot 
Voucher for free 
maternity services 
(3 ANC check-ups, 
safe delivery, 1 
postnatal check-
up). Women 
receive payment in 
cash at the 
completion of the 
visit. Also receive 
small in-kind gifts 
and transportation 
funds. 
To increase 
utilization of quality 
maternal care among 
poorer populations  
Facility-based birth 
or birth with a skilled 
attendant 
Cambodia 
Health Equity 
Fund and 
vouchers 
Voucher for free 
maternity services 
(3 ANC check-ups, 
safe delivery, 1 
postnatal check-
up). Women 
receive payment in 
cash at the 
completion of the 
visit. Also receive 
small in-kind gifts 
and transportation 
funds. 
To improve access to 
safe delivery for poor 
women to reduce 
maternal and 
newborn mortality 
and morbidity 
Utilization of 
maternity services in 
contracted health 
facilities 
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Targeting 
 Research has shown that the poor benefit less from public spending than do their 
wealthier counterparts.4 This suggests that traditional supply-side funding will not reach those 
who need access to services most. In addition to public spending, wealthier groups will 1) spend 
more in absolute terms on health care, 2) are more likely to seek health care when they need it, 
and 3) are more likely to see a doctor when they do seek care.42 While universal demand-side 
financing schemes are simplest and cheapest to implement,5 some countries have felt it a moral 
imperative to target specific groups for these reasons. 
 Targeting is a process by which specific groups or individuals become the intended 
beneficiaries of a financial incentive intervention. Depending upon the purpose and the goals of 
the intervention, the method of targeting may be different. In general, there are several 
different methods of narrowing down the beneficiaries. Categorical targeting focuses on a 
specific group of people with a common characteristic such as all pregnant women. 
Geographical targeting focuses the intervention on residents of a certain area or region such as 
a district or province with high levels of poverty. Other programs use more demanding targeting 
methods such as proxy means testing to identify individuals or households that qualify for the 
incentive based on indicators of their relative level of poverty such as level of education, 
household goods, and the condition of their home. Similar indicators might also be used in 
community-based targeting which relies upon community workers to identify eligible 
households or individuals.5 In reality, most programs use some combination of these targeting 
schemes to address the unique needs and goals of their program. (See Table 2)  
 Targeting has the capacity to direct programmatic funds to the intended recipients, but 
it is not without complications. Costs of identifying eligible individuals and households as well as 
cost effectiveness of targeting in developing countries are rarely studied in the literature and 
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need further research.2 Targeting can require significantly more time and administrative costs 
compared to other beneficial financing mechanisms and supply-side health interventions, so 
programmatic costs need to be considered.2 In addition to costs, targeting risks missing certain 
households and individuals that might be captured in more universal programs, either due to 
poor outreach or inappropriate criteria for inclusion.32 And there is always the fear that 
targeting will increase stigma against already marginalized groups. Some feel that certain 
criteria for targeting might actually discriminate against those who need the program most (e.g. 
only women with two or fewer children). 20 Without targeting, some programs have in fact not 
been able to reach the poorest and most needy. India’s CCT program saw the greatest use 
among the middle wealth quintile in districts with universal coverage.29 In general, targeting is a 
valuable tool to ensure that your program is meeting its goals and reaching those who will 
benefit most.  
Table 2. Method of Targeting by Program 
  Country Program Method of Targeting 
C
on
di
tio
na
l C
as
h 
T
ra
ns
fe
rs
 
Mexico 
Progresa/          
Oportunidades 
Two stage targeting that 1) identified poor communities for 
geographic targeting in rural Mexican provinces based upon literacy, 
household infrastructure and employment from census records and 
2) identified households for inclusion based upon socioeconomic 
characteristics.  
Honduras 
Family Assistance 
Program (PRAF II) 
Two stage targeting that 1) identified 70 municipalities with the 
highest prevalence of malnutrition and 2) identified poor households 
with pregnant women or children under 3. 
Nepal 
Safe Delivery 
Incentive Program 
(SDIP) 
Universal categorical coverage for pregnant women on a national 
scale. 
India 
Janani Suraksha 
Yojana (JSY) 
Universal coverage in 10 low-income states. In other states, 
pregnant women were eligible if they held a below-poverty-line card 
issued by the government, or if they were in a low scheduled caste. 
V
ou
ch
er
s 
Chiranjeevi 
Scheme 
Two stage targeting that limited the geographic scope to the state of 
Gujarat and then included only pregnant women with below-poverty-
line cards issued by the government. 
Bangladesh 
Maternal Health 
Voucher Scheme 
(MHVS) 
Universal categorical targeting of pregnant women in nine sub-
districts with high poverty and poor maternal health outcomes. In 
remaining 24 sub-districts, beneficiaries identified through proxy-
means testing by community committees. 
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Demand-side 
Financing Pilot 
Universal categorical targeting of pregnant women in the poorest of 
the 33 sub-districts of implementation. Community-based means 
testing is used in other sub-districts to identify beneficiaries.  
Cambodia 
Health Equity 
Fund and 
vouchers 
Community-based proxy means testing of pregnant women using 
agreed-upon criteria and community-based worker assessment to 
identify participants. 
Methods 
 
A literature search was conducted through online databases and search engines to 
identify evaluations of financial incentive schemes for demand creation. Search terms included a 
combination of the following: conditional cash transfer, cash transfer, health, health behavior, 
developing countries, low-income countries, demand, demand-side financing, demand creation, 
maternity services, maternal health services, maternal outcomes, financial incentives, financial 
barriers, vouchers, and competitive vouchers. Relevant citations were also considered for 
inclusion. The review identified a total of 11 articles that addressed financial incentives that 
affect the outcome of demand for maternity services. For this paper maternity services include 
prenatal care, skilled birth attendance, facility-based birth, and postnatal care. 
The scope of this review was limited to interventions in low- and middle-income 
countries (also sometimes described as developing countries). This paper specifically focused on 
those interventions where money was directly transferred to individuals or households through 
conditional eligibility and/or vouchers. Studies on in-kind incentives were excluded. Studies on 
unconditional cash transfers related to maternity services were not found and are therefore also 
not included. This review is also limited to those schemes that have conducted an evaluation 
whether internal to the program or external. There exist a number of financial incentive 
schemes that have yet to be formally evaluated. All types of evaluations were included due to 
the limited availability of more rigorous evaluation methods for programmatic research of 
demand-side financing schemes. 
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The evaluations vary in their scope and dependent variables of interest, but all of the 
included articles provide results on the scheme’s impact on use of maternity services. While this 
paper looks at changes in service consumption, evaluations also often study the effectiveness of 
targeting and coverage of the program as well as the quality of available services. This paper will 
touch upon these topics where relevant.  
Table 3. Program Evaluations 
 
   
  Country Program Evaluations 
Study 
Design 
Service Utilization Outcomes Select Limitations 
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
al
 C
as
h
 T
ra
n
sf
er
s 
Mexico 
Progresa/ 
Oportunidades 
Barber 
(2008), 
Barber et 
al. (2010) 
Cluster 
randomized 
controlled 
trial 
Beneficiary status does not 
predict place of delivery. 
Improved quality of prenatal 
care.  No difference in 
seeking prenatal care or the 
in the number of prenatal 
visits. 
Recall bias via 
mother's report. 
Honduras 
Family 
Assistance 
Program 
(PRAF II) 
Morris et al. 
(2004) 
Cluster 
randomized 
controlled 
trial 
Increase in the mean 
percentage of women 
receiving prenatal care by 19 
percentage points. 
Recall bias via 
mother's report. ANC 
rates higher among 
control group at 
baseline. 
Nepal 
Safe Delivery 
Incentive 
Program 
(SDIP) 
Powell-
Jackson et 
al. (2009) 
Qualitative 
study with 
purposive 
sampling 
design 
Substantial increase in 
skilled birth attendance in 
districts with appropriate 
policy implementation. No 
difference found in districts 
with poor implementation. 
Problems with 
administration and 
implementation of 
the program. Only 
evaluates the results 
of early 
implementation of 
the program. 
India 
Janani 
Suraksha 
Yojana (JSY) 
Lim et al. 
(2010) 
Quasi-
experimental 
time series 
design with 
comparison 
group 
Receipt of financial 
assistance from JSY was 
associated with a 
significantly increased 
probability of receiving 
antenatal care, giving birth in 
a health facility, and either 
giving birth in a facility or 
having a skilled attendant 
present at the time of 
delivery. The effect was 
higher in high-focus than 
non-focus states. 
Treatment effects 
are only estimated. 
Most recipients were 
from the middle 
wealth quintiles. 
V
o
u
ch
er
s 
Chiranjeevi 
Scheme 
Malavankar 
(2009)  
Quasi-
experimental 
pre- and 
post-test 
design 
without 
comparison 
Estimated 27% to 28% 
increase in institutional 
deliveries among poor 
women 
Difficult to find 
enough private 
providers to 
implement program. 
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group 
Bangladesh 
Maternal 
Health 
Voucher 
Scheme 
(MHVS) 
Ahmed et 
al. (2010) 
Qualitative 
study 
Reported increase in 
demand for antenatal, 
delivery and postnatal care 
by poor women in the 
community. Increase in 
institutional deliveries upon 
expansion of the program to 
public providers.  
Poor planning, 
administrative 
barriers, shortage of 
vouchers, delay in 
the release of funds, 
limited supply of 
quality maternity 
services in some 
areas. 
Demand-side 
Financing Pilot 
(DSF) 
Hatt et al. 
(2010), 
Schmidt et 
al. (2010) 
Quasi-
experimental 
time series 
design with 
comparison 
group 
Institutional deliveries 
increase 2.5 times that of 
comparison areas. 
Institutional deliveries were 
twice that of comparison 
group. Intervention group 
significantly more likely to 
attend 3 ANC visits, and 
seek PNC.  
Only 2 years into the 
pilot program. 
Cambodia 
Health Equity 
Fund and 
vouchers 
Por et al. 
(2008), Ir et 
al. (2010) 
Quasi-
experimental 
time series 
design with 
comparison 
group 
Facility deliveries increased 
from 16.3% of the expected 
number of births to 44.9% in 
2 years but also among self-
paying deliveries. Larger 
increase in intervention 
areas than comparison 
group. 
Confounding of other 
interventions and 
improvement in 
provider 
performance. 
Results 
Table 3 summarizes the characteristics and results of 11 studies published between 
2004 and 2010 on changes in utilization of maternity services with the implementation of 
demand-side financing schemes. Of the 11 evaluations selected for inclusion in this review, 5 
evaluated the implementation of CCT programs while the remaining 6 evaluated voucher 
schemes.  The interventions evaluated in the 11 studies took place in Mexico, Colombia, 
Honduras, Nepal, India, Bangladesh and Cambodia. Evaluations were assessed based upon their 
study design and quality, reported impact upon the outcomes of interest, and programmatic 
design limitations that may have affected the outcomes. 
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The evaluations considered different elements of maternity services in their studies. The 
most common output indicator evaluated was skilled birth attendance or facility-based births as 
found in Nepal, India, Bangladesh and Cambodia. All of these programs saw increases in skilled 
birth attendance or the proportion of women utilizing birthing facilities. The program in Nepal 
only saw improvements in the districts where the program was properly implemented, 
highlighting the need for quality program implementation if results are to be achieved. India’s 
Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY) program improved outcomes, but the greatest improvements were 
seen in the middle wealth quintiles, showing a failure to reach the target beneficiaries. The 
Bangladesh Maternal Health Voucher Scheme (MHVS) faced many obstacles to implementation, 
but also showed improved results in skilled deliveries particularly when expanding services to 
the more widely-available public sector. Cambodia saw dramatic improvements in facility-based 
deliveries among all women, but a greater increase was seen among voucher program 
participants. It should be noted that evaluations of Mexico’s Oportunidades program did 
consider place of delivery and found that participation in the CCT program was not predictive of 
place of delivery.30  
Other evaluations placed emphasis on routine pregnancy care such as prenatal visits. 
These are easily quantified and were often a requirement for CCTs and voucher fund 
disbursement. Programs in Mexico, Honduras, India and Bangladesh all saw increased demand 
and use of antenatal services. Most striking was the 19 percentage point increase in the mean 
number of women seeking prenatal care in Honduras, even with a control group that was found 
to have a higher rate of antenatal care use at the start of the program.21 While Bangladesh’s 
Demand-Side Financing Pilot (DSF) is a small-scale project and was evaluated in its early stages, 
it has shown positive increases in antenatal care utilization. Interestingly, Mexico saw increases 
in the number of prenatal procedures that beneficiaries received in comparison to the control 
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group, but no increase was found in the number of antenatal visits women attended despite it 
being a requirement of the CCT.43 Only the evaluation of Honduras’ program looked as postnatal 
care, and it found no effect on ten day postnatal check-ups.44  
While not a direct measure of utilization of maternity services, several of the 
evaluations looked at quality of care and patient satisfaction with care. Understanding relative 
quality or perceptions of quality are important to identifying why services are or are not being 
utilized when other barriers are removed.7 In all instances where satisfaction with services was 
asked of women beneficiaries, results were always positive.11,37-39,45 One author has suggested 
an improvement in quality of care and satisfaction with care is a result of women’s 
empowerment through increased control over resources, education related to quality and 
service expectations, and use of service providers that may have previously been unattainable.43  
While all of the evaluations included provide data on the effect of the financing scheme 
on utilization of maternity services, this was not the primary intended outcome of some of the 
interventions. (See Table 1) The CCT programs in Latin America were primarily designed to 
improve child health, education and family consumption. Despite this, evaluations of programs 
in Mexico and Honduras found that care-seeking behavior of women changed potentially in 
response to health education sessions or greater exposure to the health system as child 
caretakers. In Mexico where skilled delivery attendance was not a program requirement, 
women were introduced to a wide range of reproductive health services as they were required 
to use the formal health system for primary care.30 
The evaluations included are of varying quality and scientific rigor. (See Table 3) The 
evaluations of the CCT programs in Mexico and Honduras are considered to be the most 
rigorous. Described as cluster randomized controlled trials in the literature, these evaluations 
capitalized on the gradual phasing in of the program over time based upon available resources. 
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Target communities were assigned to receive the intervention or to remain a control until 
further resources were available. This provided a well-matched control group for comparison 
until the intervention was expanded. In fact, the roll out of these programs was designed to 
evaluate program impact and operational design.7 
 The DSF voucher program in Bangladesh, India’s JSY, and the Cambodia voucher 
program were evaluated using quasi-experimental designs. Comparison groups were derived 
from women who would be eligible for the voucher program if they lived in the area where the 
program was currently being implemented. Surrounding districts or states were used to find 
women with the most similar backgrounds and living conditions. The India Chiranjeevi Scheme 
was evaluated using a pre- and post-test design without a comparison group. The Bangladesh 
MHVS and Nepal’s Safe Delivery Incentive Program were entirely qualitative evaluations using 
purposive sampling of beneficiaries and program implementers. 
 Sources of program data used for the evaluations also varied between countries and 
programs. The qualitative studies relied upon key informant interviews and focus group 
discussions. The India Chiranjeevi Scheme evaluated cross-sectional data from the project 
management information system (MIS) and the routine health information system (RHIS) in the 
project area. India’s JSY project and Bangladesh’s DSF project conducted household interviews 
as well as looking at project data and the RHIS. Cambodia’s voucher program did not conduct a 
household interview, but compared the intervention and control groups through evaluating 
RHIS and available project databases in addition to qualitative data collection. All of the 
experimental and semi-experimental evaluations attempted to control for potential 
confounders.   
Discussion 
 
 Increasing Demand for Maternity Services in Developing Countries 
 
25 
 
Based upon the results of the 11 studies included in this literature review, demand-side 
financial incentives can positively affect the uptake of maternity services in low- and middle-
income countries. The studies included evaluated programs in Mexico, Colombia, Honduras, 
Nepal, India, Bangladesh and Cambodia. None of the studies found a negative effect of the 
intervention on utilization of services, but some did find the absence of any effect on certain 
components of maternity care such as the lack of change in uptake of prenatal care in Mexico 
and in 10 day postnatal check-ups in Honduras.21,43 
The strength of the findings of these evaluations is the relative simplicity of the outcome 
variable of utilization of services. Women either did or did not use the services. This leaves 
relatively little room for misinterpretation, although it does not entirely eliminate the 
probability of error.  
 These evaluations reveal a number of limitations depending upon the type of data used. 
When using comparison groups in neighboring regions to the area of implementation, there is 
always the potential for crossover effects. Women may seek out vouchers in program areas or 
benefit from the education, awareness and improvement in services associated with demand-
side financing schemes. Secondly, many of these programs, particularly those outside of Latin 
America, are young programs or even pilot programs. The true results may yet to be fully 
realized. Particularly, Bangladesh’s MHVS and India’s Chiranjeevi Scheme had particularly 
problematic start-ups with administrative confusion, poor communication of the scheme to 
providers, and delays in the disbursement of funds. Future evaluations of these programs may 
reveal different results than these early evaluations. And finally, many of the evaluations relied 
on maternal self-report of service utilization. While questions on utilization are relatively simple 
and the timeframe from the utilization of service to the time of the surveys were within 
standard survey protocol, there is always the potential for recall bias. For those evaluations that 
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relied upon program data or RHIS, the evaluations are only as good as the record keeping and 
reporting of providers, health facilities, and program staff. 
 These interventions and their evaluations represent a wide variety of contexts and 
designs. None of the studies included in this review discussed the generalizability of their 
findings to a wider national or even international context. This is most likely do to focus of the 
evaluations for internal programmatic purposes, but it raises the question of applicability of 
these findings more broadly. While comparison of findings across contexts and countries should 
be done with caution, findings allow those implementing similar programs to see demand-side 
financing program results in a variety of settings with specific health system nuances, demand 
problems and diverse challenges. 
For all of these evaluations, causality is difficult to assign, even in the control 
randomized evaluations. These evaluations are careful to assign causation to their interventions. 
Most acknowledge that the intervention could have contributed to increases in maternity 
service utilization along with other factors, and any increases can be considered estimates. It is 
particularly challenging to assign causation in developing countries where multiple interventions 
can be occurring in the same area simultaneously. In Cambodia, two other financing 
interventions were being implemented in the same area as the voucher scheme making it very 
difficult to assign causality to any one of the programs.  
Implementation  
 
 While evaluations have shown that both CCT and voucher programs have the capacity to 
positively influence uptake of maternity services in low- and middle-income countries, they may 
not be appropriate in all circumstances. When planning a demand-side financing scheme, 
programming concerns need to be considered. Firstly, programs need to have very specific 
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objectives and goals. Planning requires understanding the causes of poverty among the 
beneficiaries and the actual barriers to seeking maternity services. These can include elements 
such as gender dynamics, employment, political economy, natural resources, and conflict.32 
 Confusion in communicating these goals to the workforce that implements these 
programs has hampered the effectiveness of some programs.20 Good communication can be 
attained through a robust administrative system. Administrative capacity is essential to 
maintaining quality of the program, effectively disseminating information to the workforce and 
communities impacted, and prevention of corruption. There is a cost associated with 
administrative capacity as well as the financing program itself. Depending on the complexity of 
the program, implementation of education, targeting, cash transfers, reporting and quality 
controls can be costly. This has raised particular concerns for implementing these types of 
financing schemes in Africa where the need is great, but the capacity may not be sufficient.15 
 CCT and voucher schemes are also well-suited to particular areas. Most authors agree 
that financial incentive programs work best in urban or densely-populated areas where 
coverage is feasible. 32,36 Sparsely-populated areas may lack services, banking systems (if used 
for CCTs), and community systems that would facilitate community involvement in targeting. In 
addition, these programs need advertisement and outreach to potential beneficiaries, which 
may be impractical in rural areas.36 It is recognized that rural populations are often poorer, and 
they are those who could benefit most from these types of interventions despite the challenges 
of working in those locations. 
 It may seem intuitive, but CCT and voucher schemes with specific healthcare utilization 
goals need room to increase consumption. They are designed to address a market failure, so the 
desired outcome cannot already be purchased or consumed at a rate that gives little room for 
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improvement.33 People may already be making informed decisions not to seek care or the 
particular service desired, so reducing costs may exceed the desired benefits.4  
 There is the consensus that you cannot improve health outcomes by solely focusing on 
improving demand. Rather, there is a need for sequencing of demand-side and supply-side 
investments, so a quality supply can support increased demand.5 Demand creation is not a 
substitute for investments in supply.7,10 Some countries have taken measures to circumvent 
poor public services by contracting with private providers. While co-opting skilled providers is 
rural areas of India proved successful, simultaneous efforts need to be made to improve public 
services.45 
 Before developing a demand-creation financing project, experts need to consider 
elements of governance and political feasibility that may impact program efficacy. Governments 
are accustomed to investing in supply-side interventions, and it may take considerable advocacy 
to change the status quo. Nepal successfully used timely data for decision-making to create their 
voucher scheme.46  Costs associated with unskilled birth attendance and the desire to reach 
global maternal health goals brought the spotlight to the issue and research was used effectively 
and quickly to capitalize on the moment. As better research is completed on financial incentives 
for demand creation, it will provide greater opportunity to engage in these types of discussions 
with political leaders.  
 Once a program is established, scale-up raises additional concerns and challenges. Yet, 
there is evidence for the effective scale-up of CCT programs in Latin America. Even some of the 
programs in South Asia that began as small pilot projects have expanded to reach millions. 
India’s JSY project alone now covers nearly a third of all women who deliver in India.47 As 
programs expand, extra emphasis needs to be placed on consistency of enforcing 
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conditionalities, targeting to reach the poor, timely disbursement of funds, and avoiding fraud 
among other concerns.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 While the evidence appears to suggest a positive relation between demand creation 
financing schemes and maternity service utilization, there still remains much that is unknown. 
Does increased utilization always have a positive impact on maternal health?29 Can programs 
designed with other priorities such as improving household consumption have an impact on 
maternal outcomes? There are significant gaps in knowledge and need for further research and 
a key question remains as to how these interventions change behaviors. CCTs programs in 
particular lend themselves to questions such as whether conditionality is necessary or which 
part of the intervention is responsible for the change?7 What is the necessary size of a cash 
transfer to create the best outcomes? Is there a certain number of transfers that is ideal?32 For 
long-term cash transfers, when and how do you transition beneficiaries out of the service? For 
both types of demand-creation financing schemes, there is still little evidence on the 
relationship between the incentives and quality of care.43 Finally, costs and cost effectiveness 
need to be better explored.4 As of now, only Mexico’s Progresa has conducted any sort of cost-
effectiveness analysis.5 
As these programs mature and expand new challenges and questions will arise. As is the 
case with traditional social welfare programs, there is the reality of creating a dependency on 
the financing mechanism which may not be a desired long-term outcome.5 Many of these 
interventions have been financed through donor funding and often on a small scale.2 The 
financial sustainability and continued efficacy of the programs remain to be tested. If these 
challenges can be overcome, demand-creation financing schemes have the potential to impact 
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more than just maternity service utilization. As maternal health outcomes improve, child health 
improves, health care costs are reduced, and family stability and cohesion are maintained.  
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